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Fair use is not working. As written by Congress and applied by the
courts, the fair use law fails to give individuals sufficiently clear
guidance to determine in advance whether their uses of copyrighted
works are fair and therefore noninfringing. When the law does not
regulate adequately, markets can supply the rules. Thus, copyright
owners and prospective users of copyrighted works can-and do-
negotiate over and enter into contracts specifying permissible uses.
However, leaving fair use to the market is far from desirable. Fair
use is not meant to be something that is sold and bought like other
market goods. Fair use is free use. Nobody is meant to be paying for
the privilege of using a copyrighted work in a manner that the law
deems not to infringe the copyright in the work. Moreover, the fair
use market is not a fair market. The failure of Congress and of the
courts to provide clear guidance on the meaning of fair use permits
copyright owners to leverage the vagueness of the law and persuade
prospective users that virtually any unauthorized use constitutes
copyright infringement-and that if the use is not paid for it will
result in a lawsuit and substantial damages.
This Article offers a new approach to fair use. It proposes a role for
the one branch of the federal government that has so far been left out
of the picture: the executive branch. In most areas of the law where
clear legal directives are needed to guide behavior in particular
contexts and where Congress and the courts are unable to supply the
clarity, we turn to administrative agencies. An administrative agency
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can, and should, regulate fair use. Accordingly, the Article offers two
possible models of agency regulation. In the first model, an agency is
responsible for generating regulations that determine what con-
stitutes fair use in specific contexts as well as preventing efforts to
interfere with fair uses of copyrighted works. In the second model, an
agency issues fair use regulations and determines prior to any
copyright infringement claim being brought in court whether the use
in question constitutes fair use. Agency regulation can bring much
needed clarity and predictability to fair use in ways that neither
Congress nor the courts are able to accomplish; an agency can also
protect fair use in ways that the market does not.
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INTRODUCTION
Who should regulate fair use? Codifying the judicially-recognized
fair use doctrine, Congress incorporated a fair use defense in the
1976 Copyright Act, which established that a fair use of a copy-
righted work does not infringe the exclusive rights the Act grants to
the copyright owner. Courts have been responsible for applying the
fair use provision of the Copyright Act when they adjudicate
copyright infringement claims. Yet neither Congress in enacting the
fair use law nor the courts in applying it have supplied sufficiently
clear guidance to permit individuals who wish to make use of a
copyrighted work-and who also desire to avoid infringing the
copyright in the work-to determine whether their proposed use is
fair. Where law does not regulate, markets can, of course, supply the
rules. Thus, copyright owners and prospective users of copyrighted
works can-and do-negotiate over and enter into contracts spec-
ifying permissible uses. Yet leaving fair use to the market is far
from desirable. Fair use is not meant to be something that is sold
and bought like other market goods. Fair use is free use. Nobody is
meant to pay for the privilege of using a copyrighted work in a
manner that the law already deems not to infringe the copyright.
Moreover, the fair use market is not a fair market. The failure of
Congress and of the courts to provide clear guidance on the meaning
of fair use permits copyright owners to leverage the vagueness of the
law and persuade prospective users that virtually any unauthorized
use constitutes copyright infringement-and that if the use is not
paid for it will result in a lawsuit and substantial damages.
There is widespread-though not universal-agreement that fair
use does not function well and that reform is needed. A variety of
commentators have suggested ways to reform fair use. For example,
some commentators have suggested that in implementing the fair
use provision of the Copyright Act, courts should take greater ac-
count of First Amendment interests and of social practices.1 Other
commentators have called on Congress to amend the fair use law
with safe harbors that specify amounts of permissible copying.2
1. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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Different proposals eliminate or reduce damages against defen-
dants who have a good faith basis for believing their use of a copy-
righted work was fair.3 One commentator suggests that Congress
create an arbitration system for users of copyrighted material who
are unable to negotiate a license agreement with the copyright
owner.4 Another commentator advocates a fair use procedure similar
to the process for obtaining a private letter ruling from the IRS.5
This Article offers a new approach. It proposes a role for the one
branch of the federal government that so far has been left out of the
picture: the executive branch. In most areas of the law where clear
legal directives are needed to guide behavior in particular contexts
and where Congress and the courts are unable to supply the clarity,
we turn to administrative agencies. An administrative agency can,
and should, regulate fair use. Accordingly, this Article offers two
possible models of agency regulation. In the first model, an agency
is responsible for generating regulations that determine what con-
stitutes fair use in specific contexts as well as preventing efforts to
interfere with fair uses of copyrighted works. In the second model,
an agency issues fair use regulations and determines whether the
use in question constitutes fair use prior to any copyright infringe-
ment claim being brought in court. Agency regulation can bring
much needed clarity and predictability to fair use in ways that
neither Congress nor the courts can; an agency can also protect fair
use in ways that the market does not.
Parts I and II set out the deficiencies of current approaches to fair
use, examining respectively the inadequacy of the law of fair use
and the problems that market regulation produces. Part III offers
the proposal for agency regulation and describes the two models.
Part IV discusses the benefits of agency regulation.
3. See infra note 147.
4. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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I. FAIR USE IN CONGRESS AND THE COURTS
The 1976 Copyright Act permits fair uses of copyrighted works,6
but nobody knows whether any proposed use would be fair.
Cognizant of the "endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise" and wanting to avoid "freez[ing] the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid tech-
nological change, 7 Congress adopted a notoriously vague fair use
provision. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which governs fair
use, comprises a nonexclusive list of purposes for which use of a
copyrighted work could be deemed fair,8 along with a list of four
factors derived from case law that must be taken into account in
making a fair use determination.' Given these elements, the statute
provides little advance guidance. For the critic who seeks to quote
a copyrighted passage, the sampler who wants to incorporate the
drum introduction to a copyrighted song, the documentary film-
maker whose camera has captured a television playing in the
background, and for others who propose to make use of a copy-
righted work, it is hard to determine in advance whether a given use
would be fair. Indeterminacy, of course, is not without benefit. The
upside of the vague fair use statute is that it is also flexible. The
statutory factors can be applied to a variety of uses and in a range
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
7. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5678, 5680.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (specifying that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright)").
9. Id. Section 107 provides:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and




of contexts-including to uses and in contexts that Congress may
not have anticipated at the time it passed the law.
Certainty as to fair use comes only through litigation. Applying
§ 107, courts determine whether a use is fair and therefore non-
infringing. If Congress was too general in enacting the fair use
provision, the judicial decisions construing § 107 entail the opposite
problem. Whereas Congress refused to think in terms of specific
cases, judges necessarily issue rulings closely tied to the facts of
individual disputes. The question a judge is asked to resolve is
whether a particular defendant's copying of a specified amount of a
given work for a certain purpose falls within the protections of fair
use.10 Judicial decisions therefore fail to provide general guidance
about when a proposed use is fair-again, making future determina-
tions difficult. Judges themselves have recognized this problem.
As one federal judge has put it, judicial opinions "reflect widely
differing notions of the meaning of fair use," and "[e] arlier decisions
provide little basis for predicting later ones," so parties "can only
guess and pray" as to whether a court will find any particular use
fair. 1 Fair use law, then, exists at one extreme as a body of vague
statutory language and at the other extreme as a collection of
narrow, fact-specific, judicial decisions.' 2 Neither Congress nor the
courts have supplied sufficient clarity to guide prospective users of
copyrighted works.
Stated differently, the fair use provision of § 107 provides stan-
dards rather than rules. In the classic formulation, legal directives
fall somewhere on a continuum between rules at one end and
standards at the other.'" A rule provides clarity but it is also rigid;
a standard allows for flexibility but, because it depends upon judg-
ment calls, its application also can be unpredictable. 4 The choice
between adopting a rule or a standard depends very much on
10. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 507 U.S. 1003 (1993).
11. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990).
12. But see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541-43
(2009) (arguing that fair use law is more coherent than typically perceived-and that analyzing
putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same "policy-relevant cluster"
makes it possible to predict whether a use is likely to be fair).
13. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 57 (1992).
14. See id. at 57-59.
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context; commentators have long debated the relative benefits of
rules and standards in light of such considerations as fairness,
social productivity, liberty, and democracy. 5
When constitutional interests are implicated, the right choice-
rule or standard-is particularly significant. 6 When legal regula-
tions implicate an individual's constitutional rights, we typically
demand that government regulate with sufficient precision-a
rule-so as to allow individuals to conform their behavior to the
law's requirements as well as to prevent governmental officials from
exercising undue discretion when they enforce the law.'7 That
principle finds expression in the constitutional doctrine that unduly
vague criminal laws violate due process.' 8
Fair use, like copyright, implicates constitutional interests. The
Supreme Court has described fair use as copyright law's "built-in
First Amendment accommodation." 9 Fair use prevents the exclusive
rights copyright law confers from achieving a monopoly on, and
therefore suppressing, speech.2 ° As a result of fair use, a copyright,
although conferring substantial rights on the owner, does not bar
the critic, the parodist, and the commentator from making use of the
copyrighted work.2' A significant measure of free speech is pro-
tected.
Given the constitutional interests at stake, the standards-based
approach of fair use law is troubling. Whether any particular use is
15. See id. at 62-69 (summarizing the rules versus standards literature).
16. See id. at 69 (discussing "whether the [Supreme] Court's own constitutional precedents
ought to be construed as rules or standards; second, whether the Constitution's provisions
should be interpreted as rules or standards; and third, whether the Court," in issuing
doctrines to guide lower courts, should craft "rules or standards").
17. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also Sullivan,
supra note 13, at 62 (explaining that rules may be considered more fair than standards).
18. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (explaining that the laws must "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" and "provide
explicit standards for those who apply them").
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
20. See, e.g., id. at 197.
21. I recognize that this is not the only justification for fair use. See, e.g., Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982) (analyzing fair use as a response to
market failures); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1328-30 (2001) (discussing fair use as
promoting semiotic democracy).
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fair should not be unknowable until a judge interprets the fair use
standards and decides a case that has made its way to court. Indeed,
the uncertainty of fair use law is in tension with two core First
Amendment principles. The first principle, reflected in the doctrine
against prior restraint injunctions, is that speech should not be
curtailed during the time in which a court is deciding whether that
speech is protected.22 That the law's uncertainty and the speaker's
own aversion to risk, rather than a court order, produce the
curtailment does not alter the fact that speech is not heard. The
second principle, reflected in the rules against licensing schemes
that give decision makers unbridled discretion, is that governmental
officials should not be empowered to make ad hoc decisions about
which speech is permitted.23 That judges are the governmental
officials who exercise this discretion in fair use cases may be of some
comfort, but it does not fully remedy the problem. More generally,
First Amendment concerns are especially strong in the modern fair
use context. In an age in which everybody is an author, the uncer-
tainty about fair use affects vast numbers of individuals-and vast
amounts of speech. Copyright infringement also can trigger very
substantial civil 2 --and in some cases criminal-penalties." Much
22. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976) (describing prior restraint
as "the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights").
23. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
24. A copyright owner can seek injunctive relief, impounding and disposition of infringing
articles, actual damages and profits earned by the infringing party, or statutory damages up
to $30,000 per work, or $150,000 per work in the case of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§
501-504 (2006). In addition, at the discretion of a court, reasonable costs and attorneys' fees
may be awarded. Id. §§ 501, 505.
25. See id. § 506(a) (specifying that "[a]ny person who willfully infringes a copyright shall
be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was
committed-(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the
reproduction or distribution ... of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value
of more than $1,000"). As a result of the 1982 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act
(passed to address large-scale infringement of movies and records), Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96
Stat. 91 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2319 (2006) and 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)
(2006)), and the Copyright Felony Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992)
(providing for prison sentences of one, five, and ten years) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319 (2006)), violations of § 506(a) can trigger prison time and other substantial penalties.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006) (imposing criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up
to ten years, for repeat offenders making ten or more illegal copies with a value of more than
$2500). In addition to the Copyright Act, other federal statutes provide civil and criminal
remedies for specific kinds of copyright violations. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1204 (2006)
(providing criminal penalties for circumventing antipiracy protections contained in software
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is at stake, then, for many people. Standards do not work well in
protecting constitutional rights under these circumstances.
II. FAIR USE AND MARKETS
Where the law does not regulate with sufficient clarity, markets
can fill the void. Somebody who wants to make use of a copyrighted
work without facing a legal penalty can, therefore, license the use
from the copyright owner. A valid license removes the use from the
vagaries of fair use doctrine. Contract law can produce the certainty
that copyright law, as written by Congress and applied by the
courts, fails to supply.
However, reliance on contracts is inconsistent with the purpose
of fair use. Fair use is a use that does not require permission
because it is not infringement.2" When fair uses require licensing,
fair use law is not performing its very function. Moreover, fair use
does not exist merely for the benefit of private parties. The basic
idea of fair use goes back to the constitutional purpose behind
copyright: to promote creative progress. In some circumstances,
society benefits by authorizing people to make use of a work even
though the work is protected by copyright. Without a fair use
doctrine, copyright owners would have virtually complete control
over use of their works. Fair use reflects the idea that this would not
be desirable for the public as a whole. Many creative works build
upon, borrow from, and react to earlier works. Fair use permits
these kinds of activities. A commentator who wants to make a point
about a prior work often needs to reproduce a small part of that
and for making, selling, or distributing code-cracking devices used to copy software illegally);
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006) (including counterfeiting and criminal infringement of copyright
as predicate RICO offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006) (making punishable by fines and up to
five years imprisonment these acts: trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, copies
of computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging, copies of motion
pictures or other audio visual works, and trafficking in counterfeit computer program
documentation or packaging); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006) (prohibiting unauthorized fixation of
and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos with fines and up to five years
imprisonment for first-time offenders and ten years imprisonment for repeat offenders); 47
U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (prohibiting unauthorized reception of cable services with maximum
penalty of six months imprisonment and $1000 fine for individual use, two years
imprisonment and $50,000 fine for commercial gain, and five years imprisonment and
$100,000 fine for repeat offenders).
26. See supra note 8.
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work. A movie critic may desire to quote language from the script.
News broadcasters often need to repeat statements made by others.
Historians enrich their works by reproducing the words and works
of their subjects. Humorists draw on preexisting writings and
images to poke fun at them. If these uses could not be made without
the permission of-and payment to-the copyright owner, the loss
to the public would be enormous. This is particularly true with
respect to works that criticize or ridicule earlier works. In a world
in which permission were needed for any use, the flatterer would be
more likely to receive the necessary authorization than would the
critic. Fair use promotes the overall flow of creative works by
authorizing some copying of copyrighted works.
Leaving the rules of fair use to private parties to determine
impedes these public ends. An absence of sufficient guidance in
either § 107 of the Copyright Act or court decisions construing and
applying § 107 permits content owners to make the extraordinary
claim that no unauthorized use of their works is fair. Several
examples help to illustrate this point:
(1) Book publishers routinely attach notices to books
stating that no portion of the book can be copied
without the publisher's consent. Penguin USA claims
that permission is required "for the use of an excerpt
from copyrighted material to be used in another
work," including "a short quotation from one book
used in another book. 27
(2) The estate of James Joyce threatened to sue Carol
Loeb Shloss, an English professor at Stanford Univer-
sity, if she published a book containing excerpts,
however short, from Joyce's writings.28
(3) Major League Baseball (MLB) asserts: "Any rebroad-
cast, reproduction or other use of the pictures and
27. Penguin Group Permissions FAQ, http://us.penguingroup.com/static/pages/
permissions/PermissionsFAQ.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
28. Represented by law professor Larry Lessig, Shloss filed an action against the estate
seeking a declaratory judgment that the excerpts at issue were covered by the fair use
doctrine. The case settled and publication proceeded. See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d
1083, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Press Release, Stanford Law School, Stanford Scholar Wins
Right to Publish Joyce Material in Copyright Suit (Mar. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/55/.
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accounts of this game without the express written
consent of Major League Baseball is prohibited."29 So,
too, the National Football League (NFL) asserts:
' This telecast is copyrighted by the NFL for the
private use of our audience. Any other use of this
telecast or of any pictures, descriptions, or accounts
of the game without the NFL's consent, is prohib-
ited.'' 0
(4) The New York Times claims: "Authorized permission
is always necessary when using New York Times
content for photocopying, republication or redistribu-
tion and for all uses in electronic formats."'"
(5) ABC News tells other networks they may use no
more than 30 seconds of footage from a 2008 presi-
dential debate.
(6) DVDs carry notices like this one: "All material is
protected by copyright laws of the United States and
all countries throughout the world. All rights re-
served. Any unauthorized exhibition, distribution, or
copying of this film or any part thereof (including
soundtrack) is an infringement of the relevant copy-
right and will subject the infringer to severe civil and
criminal penalties."33
(7) Computer software comes with a notice prohibiting
reverse engineering even though most reverse engi-
neering is fair use. 4
29. See Cory Tadlock, Copyright Misuses, Fair Use, and Abuse: How Sports and Media
Companies are Overreaching Their Copyright Protections, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 621, 623 n.13 (2008).
30. See Tyler McCormick Love, Throwing the Flag on Copyright Warnings: How
Professional Sports Organizations Systematically Overstate Copyright Protection, 15 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 369, 379 (2008) (citing NFL Football: Dallas Cowboys v. New England Patriots (CBS
television broadcast Oct. 14, 2007)).
31. New York Times Reprint Services, http://www.nytreprints.com/Products.asp (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
32. Brian Stelter, ABC Restricts Debate Clips to 30 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008,
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/abc-restricts-debate-clips-to-30-seconds-
cable-channels-may-cite-fair-use/.
33. See, e.g., Roger & Me Credits, http://www.michaelmoore.com/dogeatdogfilms/
rmecredits.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
34. See, e.g., Brad Frazer, Open Source is not Public Domain: Evolving Licensing
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Many people are sufficiently risk-averse--or are pressured by risk-
averse publishers, distributors, or insurers-that, when faced with
these kinds of notices they forego copying or making other uses of
copyrighted works entirely or they obtain permission before doing
so." Compounding the problem, a variety of authoritative-sounding
voices instruct potential users always to seek permission. The
"Friends of Active Copyright Education," an initiative of the
Copyright Society of the U.S.A.,36 says on its website that "consent
is required from the copyright owner to use clips or photographs in
a motion picture, no matter [how] de minimis or short" and that
[u] se of any copyrighted music ... no matter how short (even if only
a few notes) ... must be cleared with the copyright owner. 37 In
addition, "[i]f you intend to quote or even paraphrase the words of
another author, you should obtain the author's permission before
doing so."" As to § 107, the Friends advise, "[iut is risky to rely on
the 'fair use' doctrine" and thus "[t]he best course of action is simply
to seek permission for all copied materials you intend to use."39 Even
the Copyright Office takes a highly cautious view of fair use. In its
circular on fair use, it states the following:
The safest course is always to get permission from the copyright
owner before using copyrighted material.... When it is impracti-
cable to obtain permission, use of copyrighted material should be
avoided unless the doctrine of "fair use" would clearly apply to
Philosophies, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 349, 372 (2009); Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: Reverse
Engineering, http://chillingeffects.org/reverse/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
35. For example, Amy Sewell, the producer of "Mad Hot Ballroom," a documentary about
New York City children and ballroom dancing, paid out $170,000, more than a quarter of her
$500,000 budget, for clearance costs for music played during filming, including $2500 to EMI
because a cellphone belonging to one of the film's subjects had a six-second ringtone that
played the theme from Rocky. See Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 2, at A13. Although Sewell thought she could invoke fair use, her
lawyer advised her that "for your first film, you don't have enough money to fight the music
industry" and that she should license everything, however short. Id. The "fear factor"
prompted her to pay up. How Did Mad Hot Ballroom Survive the Copyright Cartel?, Stay
Free! Daily, http:/Iblog.stayfreemagazine.orgI2005/06/mad-hotballroo.html (June 22, 2005).
36. Welcome to FACE, http://www.csusa.org/face/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
37. Moving Images Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.csusa.org/face/movim/
faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
38. Words Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.csusa.org/face/words/faqs.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
39. Id.
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the situation. The Copyright Office can neither determine if a
certain use may be considered "fair" nor advise on possible
copyright violations. If there is any doubt, it is advisable to
consult an attorney.40
If the Copyright Office does not put much stock in fair use, it is hard
to expect members of the general public to rely on fair use either.
Worse, as James Gibson explains, licensing that occurs as a result
of the law's uncertainty ends up narrowing judicial interpretations
of what fair use permits.41
Beyond deterring fair use by misinformation and threat, content
owners who can control access to a copyrighted work routinely
prevent fair uses by limiting access to those who agree in advance
not to make any use of the work and to forego any fair use claim.42
Here is a scenario that is familiar to many researchers: As a result
of a bequest, an archive owns the physical copy of a letter of
historical significance as well as the copyright in the letter. In order
to view the letter, the researcher must sign an agreement with the
archive that provides, among other things, that the researcher will
never publish any excerpt of the copyrighted letter without the
permission of the archive even if such publication were protected by
the fair use provision of the Copyright Act. To access the letter, the
researcher waives fair use.
Digital delivery facilitates the role of markets and contract law in
making fair use disappear. Books, music, and other works increas-
ingly are delivered in electronic form. In order to receive these
digital works, the consumer is required to agree to "terms of use"
imposed by the vendor.43 Content owners have used these arrange-
ments to extract from consumers their agreement that they will not
use the delivered materials in ways that the Copyright Act would
deem fair and therefore noninfringing. 44 Vendors of databases, for
example, often condition access to the database upon an agreement
not to copy or distribute the materials without the vendor's per-
40. U.S. Copyright Office, Fair Use Factsheet, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fll02.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
41. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-906 (2007) (discussing copyright's feedback loop).
42. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
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mission, even though fair use law allows at least some forms of
copying and distribution. Consider, for example, this provision in
the terms and conditions accompanying U.S. News and World
Report's ranking of colleges:
The materials contained on the Web site are provided by U.S.
News as a service to you for your noncommercial, personal use
... and may be used by you for information purposes only.... All
materials published on the Web site are protected by copyright
laws, and may not be reproduced, republished, distributed,
transmitted, resold, displayed, broadcast, or otherwise exploited
in any manner without the express written permission of [] U.S.
News.45
The Copyright Act does not limit uses of copyrighted materials to
noncommercial, personal, and informational uses. Fair use allows
some reproduction and dissemination without the permission of
the copyright owner.46 By accepting the terms and conditions im-
posed by U.S. News, however, the individual who accesses the
college rankings purportedly foregoes activities that the Copyright
Act permits.
In similar fashion, individuals who purchase music in MP3
format from Amazon.com enter into a click-through contract that
states: "[Y]ou agree that you will not redistribute, transmit, assign,
sell, broadcast, rent, share, lend, modify, adapt, edit, license or
otherwise transfer or use the Digital Content."47 In order to make
music purchases from the iTunes store, the consumer must agree to
a long series of provisions, including an acknowledgment that the
consumer may "use the Products only for personal, noncommercial
use."4 Before users of Amazon's Kindle, the electronic book-reading
device, can read a book in digital form, they must agree to the
following provision: "[Y]ou may not sell, rent, lease, distribute,
broadcast, sublicense or otherwise assign any rights to the Digital
45. U.S. News & World Report, Terms & Conditions of Use and Privacy Policy,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/usinfo/terms.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
47. Amazon MP3 Music Service: Terms of Use, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=200154280 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
48. iTunes Store, Terms and Conditions, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.
html#SERVICE (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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Content or any portion of it to any third party."49 Subscribers to
Rhapsody, an audio streaming service, enter into a contract that
provides:
The Services available through the Application, and the Applica-
tion itself (including the Content), are the property of Rhapsody
or its licensors and are protected by copyright and other
intellectual property laws. The Services provided through the
Application may be used for your personal, non-commercial use
only. You agree not to (i) reproduce, record, retransmit, redis-
tribute, disseminate, sell, rent, lend, broadcast, publicly perform,
adapt, sub-license or circulate the Application or any Content
received through the Application or any Service (including music
content) to any third party, (ii) exploit any such Content or the
Application for commercial purposes without the express prior
written consent of Rhapsody, or (iii) to share your password with
any third party. You may not make any unauthorized copies of
the Application or the Content obtained through the Services,
and may only make such copies as are reasonably necessary for
your personal, non-commercial use.
Many uses that the Rhapsody subscriber, by assenting to the
contract, agrees to forego would be protected by fair use law.5°
Computer software licensees also must agree to forego uses that
would be considered fair. Licensees of Adobe Acrobat Pro software,
for example, must agree "not to modify, adapt [or] translate" any
compiled software.5" The Microsoft Vista license prohibits licensees
from "us[ing] components of the software to run applications not
running on the software."52 Users of Minitab Statistical Software
must agree not to use it for "develop[ment of] any commercially
resalable product that is generally competitive" with Minitab.5
49. Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, http://www.amazon.com
gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld=200144530 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
50. Rhapsody Service Terms and Conditions, http://rhapreg.real.com/rhapsody/freeform?
freeformname=RhapC Terms (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
51. Adobe Acrobat Reader, End User Licensing Agreement, http://www.adobe.com/
products/acrviewer/eula.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
52. Microsoft Software License Terms § 8, available at http://download.microsoft.com/
documents/useterms/Windows%2oVistaUltimateEnglish_36d0fe99-75e4-4875-8153-
889cf5105718.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
53. License Agreement for Minitab Statistical Software, http://www.minitab.com/en-
US/company/legal/license-agreements/minitab-eula.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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Watching ABC television programs on a computer requires install-
ing software made available only to users who agree they will not
"redistribute, sell, auction, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble
or otherwise reduce the Software to a human-readable form. ' 4
The world of sports provides another example in which control of
access is used to limit activities that the Copyright Act protects.
Major League Baseball requires reporters seeking press credentials
to sign an agreement imposing strict limitations on the reporter's
activities. The contract prohibits uses of photographs and videos as
well as any "account, description ... or other information concerning
the Games" other than for "news coverage of, or magazines, books
or stories about, the Games, or for First Amendment-protected
purposes."55 During the game, the bearer of the press credential is
prohibited from "transmitting any Game Information on a play-by-
play or pitch-by-pitch basis, more frequently than once every half-
inning.""6 Other provisions limit the length of video and audio feed,
prohibit excising advertising, restrict posting of video from inside
the ballpark online, and require photographers to sell prints to the
MLB under the best terms made available to any other party.5 7 So,
too, the National Football League permits only press conferences
and team practice sessions to be posted online; footage is limited to
forty-five seconds, cannot be available for more than twenty-four
hours, and cannot be archived.58 In issuing media credentials for its
events, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) also
limits the activities of reporters. The NCAA requires that video of
its events be used within seventy-two hours following the event
(twenty-four hours in the case of web use) and not exceed three
54. ABC Open, Terms of Use, http://developer.abc.com/user/register (last visited Oct. 21,
2009).
55. Terms and Conditions of Credentials for Major League Baseball Games, Workouts,
Activities and Events, available at http://www.apme.com/news/2008/022808mlbcredentials.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
56. Id.
57. Id. MLB, in imposing these requirements, obviously is concerned about protecting the
interests of broadcasters who purchase the rights to carry the games live. In addition, the
league and individual teams have their own websites with game footage, photographs, and
reports that generate substantial revenues. See, e.g., The Official Site of the Houston Astros,
http://houston.astros.mlb.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
58. ASNE, NFL Memo on Rules for Credentials (May 21, 2007), http://204.8.120.192/
index.cfm?ID=6605.
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minutes in length (sixty seconds for web use).59 The NCAA gives
credential holders the "privilege to blog" during games but limits the
number of postings depending on the sport."0 For example, during
soccer games, bloggers may make no more than five posts per half
and one post at halftime.6 The NCAA also prohibits credentialed
parties from providing images from the games to anybody else.62
In sum, neither Congress nor the courts have provided sufficient
clarity to allow individuals to determine in advance whether a
proposed use of a copyrighted work is a fair use and therefore does
not infringe the copyright. As a result, copyright owners, by lever-
aging the vagueness of the fair use doctrine to threaten litigation
and controlling access to works, are able to determine what uses, if
any, can be made of copyrighted works. Fair use is meant to limit
the rights of copyright owners. Instead, it has become one more area
that copyright owners control. The next Part proposes restoring fair
use to its proper status by assigning the task of regulating fair use
to a federal agency.
III. FAIR USE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The modern state is an administrative state. For the day-to-day
implementation of the law, government relies upon administrative
agencies. Agencies are especially important when legal directives
are required to guide people's behavior but neither Congress nor the
courts are able to regulate with sufficient clarity. Congress often
lacks the institutional capacity (or the will) to determine how a
statute will apply on the ground and in a variety of contexts. And
although courts decide individual issues, it often takes a long time
for judicial rulings to form a comprehensive regulatory framework.
Administrative agencies fill these voids.




61. See 2007-08 Conditions Placed on Use of Media Credentials, available at http:/!
cache.deadspin.com/assets/resources/2007/12/2008-blogging-policy.pdf; NCAA Goes Medieval
On Live Blogging, WEBPRONEWS Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2007/
12/20/ncaa-goes-medieval-on-live-blogging.
62. NCAA, supra note 59.
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Federal agencies play a part in the administration of some
aspects of intellectual property law. 3 Yet compared to other areas
of federal law, the role of agencies in intellectual property law is
quite limited. This is surprising. Intellectual property law is well-
suited to agency governance. In the modern information society,
intellectual property laws affect vast numbers of individuals and
entities. Virtually every use or creation of information raises ques-
tions of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property law also
is increasingly complex. New issues of how intellectual property law
applies in a specific context regularly arise. Under these conditions,
it is unrealistic to expect Congress or the courts to provide and
update the legal directives that can guide behavior on a daily
basis.'
In other nations, agencies play roles in administering copy-
right law. In Finland, a Copyright Council within the Ministry of
Education issues opinions on the application of that nation's
Copyright Act.65 The Council is composed of representatives of the
major right holders and users of protected works as well as aca-
demic professionals.66 Although the Council's opinions are not
63. Two agencies are especially significant: the Library of Congress, a legislative agency,
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an agency that is part of the
Department of Commerce. Within the Library of Congress, the United States Copyright Office
registers copyrights, provides assistance to Congress (including preparing copyright
legislation and legislative reports and providing advice on compliance with multilateral
agreements), and administers compulsory and statutory licenses. See U.S. Copyright Office,
http://www.copyright.gov (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). The Copyright Royalty Board, appointed
by the Librarian of Congress, is responsible for determining and adjusting the rates and terms
of statutory licenses. See U.S. Copyright Royalty Board, http://www.loc.gov/crb/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009). The USPTO issues patents and registers trademarks. See United States Patent
and Trademark Office Homepage, http://uspto.gov/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
64. One commentator describes a shift in copyright law from a property rights model to
a regulatory model-but without a corresponding rise in the role of administrative agencies.
See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REv. 87, 90-92 (2004) (discussing how, in
the past, copyright law defined a simple, industry-neutral property entitlement that the
courts enforced and elaborated in a common-law-like manner, whereas today copyright law
is characterized by greater legal intervention in the structure and functioning of a particular
market through complex and detailed statutes, industry- and technology-specific rules,
intervention into markets, and stronger policymaking power in Congress-and to a lesser
extent the Library of Congress-rather than the courts).
65. See Finnish Ministry of Education, Copyright in Finland, http://www.minedu.fi/
OPM/Tekijaenoikeuns/lang-en (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
66. See Finnish Ministry of Education, Copyright Council, http://www.minedu.fi/OPM
Tekijaenoikeus/tekijaenoikeusneuvosto/?languen (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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binding, courts have given them deference. The Council's opinions
also inform the public's understanding of copyright law.67 A recent
development in Israel is also notable. In 2007, Israel enacted a new
copyright statute, which took effect in May 2008. 8 Chapter Four of
the statute provides for "Permitted Uses." 9 It specifies:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11 [setting out the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner], the doing of the actions
specified in sections 19 to 30 is permitted subject to the condi-
tions specified respectively in the aforesaid sections and for the
purpose of carrying out the objectives specified therein, without
the consent of the right holder or payment. °
Section 19 of Chapter Four provides for fair use of copyrighted
works.71 It contains three subsections. The first, which tracks the
purpose clause of § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, states: "Fair use
of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private study, research,
criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction
and examination by an educational institution. 72 The second
subsection adopts the four fair use factors from § 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act for determining whether a use is fair.73 The third
subsection provides: "The Minister [of Justice] may make regula-
tions prescribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed a
fair use. ' 74 Authorizing the Ministry of Justice to issue fair use reg-
ulations resulted from a concern that greater precision was needed
but neither the legislature nor the courts could supply it. With this
statutory authority in place, the Minister of Justice is now begin-
ning the process of issuing fair use regulations.75
It is time to consider how intellectual property law in the United
States can benefit from increased involvement by federal agencies.
The current state of fair use demonstrates the problem of keeping
67. See Finnish Ministry of Education, supra note 65.








75. This statement is based on my own conversations with Israeli law professors.
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intellectual property law out of the hands of agencies. It is therefore
a good place to begin. Here, then, is a proposal: Congress should do
what it does in a variety of contexts where the details of laws need
to be filled out and direct an agency to administer fair use. Agency
regulation can shift fair use from standards to rules and from
litigation to administration. While there are a variety of ways in
which agency administration of fair use might be structured, this
Part offers two possible models.
A. Model One: The Office for Fair Use
Under Model One, Congress would do three things. First,
Congress would make it unlawful to interfere with fair uses of
copyrighted works and subject offenders to civil penalties. Similar
to federal consumer protection laws,76 a federal fair use protection
statute would protect the public from false claims and other
practices by copyright owners that limit fair uses of copyrighted
works. Second, Congress would create an agency whose principal
task would be to enforce this statute. Let us call this agency the
Office for Fair Use (TOFU). TOFU would enforce the statute
through the usual agency mechanisms of rulemaking and adjudica-
tion. Third, Congress would specify that federal fair use law,
including TOFU's regulations, preempts state laws of contract that
limit fair uses of copyrighted works.
Under Model One, TOFU would generate regulations prohibiting
interference with fair uses of copyrighted works. These regulations
would specify, consistent with the provisions of § 107 of the
Copyright Act,77 the uses that constitute fair uses of copyrighted
works in specific sectors. In developing regulations that define fair
76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), (n) (2006) (making unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce" and defining unfair practices as those that "cause[] or
[are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition"); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (2006) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (West 2009)) (providing the text of four health-related warning
labels and requiring that cigarette packages and advertisements carry these warnings on a
rotating basis); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2006) (requiring
that all consumer commodities other than food, drugs, therapeutic devices, and cosmetics be
labeled to disclose net contents, identity of commodity, and name and place of business of the
product's manufacturer, packer, or distributor).
77. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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use and prohibit interference with it, TOFU would be expected to
receive input from copyright owners, those who seek to make use of
copyrighted works, representatives from relevant industries and
interest groups, copyright law experts, and other interested parties.
In making rules, most federal agencies use the procedure of notice
and comment provided for under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)." Under this procedure, the agency gives the general public
notice that a rule is being contemplated, provides the language or
a general description of the proposed rule, and invites comments
from the public.79 Some agencies, including the Environmental
Protection Agency, use a process of regulatory regulation prior to
notice and comment. In regulatory regulation, the agency brings
together representatives of groups affected by a rulemaking to ne-
gotiate the terms of the proposed rule.8' Fair use rules are well-
suited to the public notice and comment procedure, and also may be
suited to regulatory regulation. Developing fair use regulations also
might be an especially good vehicle for the use of the technological
measures Beth Noveck has identified for promoting high-quality
public participation in the comment process.8
Like other agency regulations, TOFU's fair use regulations would
have the force of law.82 Uses of copyrighted materials in accordance
with TOFU's regulations, therefore, would be fair use and non-
infringing." Conversely, use of materials in ways that TOFU's rules
do not permit would not be fair use. In accordance with the provi-
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
79. See id. The APA permits agencies to receive comments through an "oral presentation,"
and it sets up a mechanism for an evidentiary hearing when such a hearing is required by the
agency's enabling act. Id. §§ 553(c), 556-557.
80. See id. §§ 570-581.
81. Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
480-92 (2004).
82. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIsTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) ("[R]ules, other than organizational or procedural [rules] ...
issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute, ... have
the force and effect of law.").
83. As is normally true of agency rules, TOFU's rules would have only prospective effect.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining a rule as "an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect"); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("The only plausible reading of the ... phrase is that rules have legal
consequences only for the future.").
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sions of the APA, judicial review of TOFU's regulations would be
limited.'
In addition to rulemaking, TOFU could bring enforcement
actions to enforce the prohibition on interfering with fair use
through the adjudicative mechanisms provided in the APA. 5 When
TOFU believed that a violation of the law has occurred, it would
issue a complaint setting forth its charges. The respondent could
settle with TOFU or contest the charges and proceed to adjudication
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ would issue an
initial decision setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law
and the disposition of the case. The ALJ could decide in favor of the
respondent and dismiss the case, or, upon finding that the respon-
dent violated the statute, assess civil penalties, issue an order to
cease and desist, or impose other appropriate remedies. The ALJ's
initial decision would be subject to review within the agency, which
would enter a final decision and order. TOFU's final orders would
be reviewable in the U.S. Court of Appeals. Violations of TOFU's
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing that the reviewing court shall "compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" and "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action" that violates a statute, the Constitution, or a procedure established by law or that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). In
Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court set out the
standard of judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.... If Congress has explicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.
In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (citations omitted).
85. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2006).
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final orders would also be subject to separate civil penalties through
a suit in district court to enforce the agency's order. Once TOFU has
determined in a litigated administrative adjudicatory proceeding
that a practice constitutes an unlawful interference with fair use
and has issued a final cease and desist order, TOFU would be able
to obtain civil penalties from other parties who thereafter violate
the standards articulated by TOFU. Similar to the authority of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),8 TOFU could also be empowered
to challenge a practice directly in court without first making a final
agency determination that the challenged conduct is unlawful.
Under Model One, defendants in copyright infringement actions
could assert fair use as a defense. In determining whether a par-
ticular use is fair and therefore renders the defendant's copying
noninfringing, courts would defer to TOFU's regulations. Given that
those regulations would define fair use with considerable specificity,
in most instances, it would be clear whether a use is fair well before
appearing before a judge.
Administrative law experts will recognize that giving TOFU
power to enforce a prohibition on interfering with fair use may be
essential in order for courts to defer to TOFU's regulations on what
fair use permits. The Supreme Court has indicated that Chevron
deference is inappropriate where a statute is administered by the
courts rather than by the agency itself." It is, therefore, unlikely
that courts would accept an agency's understanding of fair use law
if the agency's sole function was to issue interpretive regulations. By
contrast, giving TOFU enforcement power makes judicial deference
on the meaning of fair use appropriate.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000) (authorizing the FTC to seek preliminary and permanent
injunctions in district court to remedy violations of "any provision of law enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission"). Courts have construed this provision to also permit equitable
monetary relief. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1024-
28 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("Congress has expressly
established the Judiciary and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of private rights
of action arising under the statute. A precondition to deference under Chevron is a
congressional delegation of administrative authority.").
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B. Model Two: The Copyright Infringement Review Office
Under Model Two, Congress would give a federal agency more
general responsibility in copyright infringement claims. Let us call
this agency the Copyright Infringement Review Office (CIRO). As in
Model One, CIRO would have power to issue regulations defining
fair use, which would remain a defense to a claim of copyright
infringement. CIRO also would have adjudicative authority. A copy-
right owner alleging infringement would be required to file, prior to
going to court, a complaint with CIRO. The respondent then would
be given an opportunity to assert a fair use defense. If within some
designated time period no fair use defense is asserted, the copyright
owner would be entitled to proceed with the copyright infringement
claim in federal court, where the respondent would be deemed to
have waived a fair use defense."8 If, on the other hand, the respon-
dent asserts a fair use defense, CIRO would conduct an investiga-
tion to determine if the allegedly infringing use is a fair use under
CIRO's fair use regulations. If CIRO concludes that the use is fair
and there was no infringement, it would issue a notice to this effect.
The copyright owner then would have a period of time in which to
file a lawsuit. If CIRO concludes that no fair use defense is available
and therefore the respondent's copying is likely infringing, it could
attempt a settlement between the parties or issue a notice auth-
orizing the copyright owner to bring a lawsuit within a designated
period of time. In deciding the copyright infringement action, courts
would defer to the agency's decision as to whether under the
Copyright Act and agency regulations the use at issue is a fair use.
There are, of course, existing models for this form of streamlined
dispute resolution. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation through a charge processing procedure. Under this proce-
dure, an individual who believes he or she is a victim of employment
discrimination files a charge with the EEOC, 9 which then conducts
an investigation.9 ° The EEOC may dismiss the charge and issue the
complaining party a notice to that effect; the complaining party then
88. There would be a procedure for expedited review by CIRO in cases where the plaintiff
seeks a preliminary injunction.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (2002).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15.
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has ninety days in which to file a lawsuit.9 If the EEOC determines
that discrimination did occur, it will attempt conciliation with the
employer to develop a remedy.9 2 If conciliation is unsuccessful, the
EEOC may bring a lawsuits3 or close the case and give the employee
ninety days to bring suit.
4
In a different context, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) has established a Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) to resolve internet domain
name registration disputes.9 " A registrant seeking to register a
domain name must represent that the name does not infringe
any third party's rights and agree to participate in a mandatory
administrative proceedings should a third party assert a claim. 6
Administrative Panels formed by approved dispute resolution
providers conduct these proceedings. v Administrative Panels have
authority to cancel a domain name registration (or transfer it) if the
complainant demonstrates that the registrant's domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights, the registrant has no rights or
legitimate interests in the domain name, and the domain name has
been registered and is being used in bad faith, determined through
a multifactor test.9" Although UDRP does not preclude subsequent
litigation, it provides a streamlined process for resolving domain
name disputes. Commentators have offered different perspectives
on the effectiveness of the process.9 9
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19,
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27.
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.





99. On the UDRP, see A. Michael Froomkin, ICAAN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy'L-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 670-711 (2002) (describing
criticisms of UDRP and proposing reforms); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for
Private Dispute Resolution Services--An Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP
Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285, 368-69 (2005) (reporting on problems
of forum shopping by complainants and performance differences across UDRP providers);
Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Developing an Online Dispute Resolution Environment:
Dialogue Tools and Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step Model, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 287,299 (2005) (reporting that UDRP handled over 6,000 disputes in five years); Michael
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Authorizing an agency to issue regulations defining fair use
would allow individuals to determine in advance whether a pro-
posed use of a copyrighted work is fair. Empowering the agency to
adjudicate the fair use element of any copyright infringement claim
would remove questions of fair use from litigation. An agency can
provide both precision in the law and a streamlined process for
resolving disputes that arise.
C. Fair Use Regulations
Both Model One and Model Two provide for an agency to issue
regulations governing fair use. Although it is not the purpose of this
Article to set out the specific fair use regulations the agency should
adopt, it is useful to consider the form such regulations would
take. Fair use guidelines have been developed in specific contexts,
particularly to guide educators and librarians. Although these
guidelines lack the force of law, they are the obvious starting point
for thinking about an agency's task in developing fair use regula-
tions.
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act included two
sets of educational guidelines. First, it included the Agreement on
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals (Classroom
Guidelines).0 ° These guidelines were developed by representatives
of the Authors League of America, Inc., the Association of American
Publishers, Inc., and the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational
Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision "to state
the minimum [and not the maximum] standards of educational fair
use."'1 Second, the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act set
forth the Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music."0 2 These
guidelines, designed to provide minimum standards, were developed
Geist, Fundamentally Fair.Com? An Update on Bias Allegations and the ICANN UDRP,
(unpublished manuscript available at, http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/fairupdate.pdf) (reporting
on different success rates depending on the size of the Administrative Panel).
100. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-
83; see also UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 21: REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 7-8 (1995), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circ21.pdf [hereinafter CIRCULAR 21].
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976).
102. Id. at 70-74; see also CIRCULAR 21, supra note 100, at 9.
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by representatives of the Music Publishers' Association of the
United States, Inc., the National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.,
the Music Teachers National Association, the Music Educators
National Conference, the National Association of Schools of Music,
and the Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision.
1°3
The House also considered guidelines for "Off-Air Taping of
Copyrighted Works for Educational Use."1 4 Unlike the guidelines
for books, periodicals, and music, these guidelines do not articulate
that they are intended to state only the minimum standards of fair
use. Rather, they "specify periods of retention and use of such off-air
recordings in classrooms and similar places devoted to instruction
and for homebound instruction" in order to "provide standards for
both owners and users of copyrighted television programs."105
In addition, in 1998 the Conference on Fair Use (CONFU)
attempted to make educational fair use guidelines that addressed
the concerns raised by new technologies.0 6 CONFU developed three
sets of guidelines: Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital
Images, Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning,
and Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia (Multimedia
Guidelines).0 7 Although a set of guidelines also was developed for
electronic reserve systems, it failed to gather the necessary
consensus support to become CONFU guidelines.10
Librarians also sought to develop guidelines. One early set of
library guidelines was the CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying
Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements, which was adopted in 1978
by the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
righted Works.109 These guidelines set forth procedures to determine
whether a given amount of photocopying is allowed."0 The American
Library Association (ALA) also has developed guidelines for the use
103. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 70 (1976).
104. 127 CONG. REC. 24,048-49 (1981); see also CIRCULAR 21, supra note 100, at 22.
105. CIRCULAR 21, supra note 100, at 22.
106. See generally BRUCE A. LEHMAN, THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE (1998) [hereinafter
CONFU FINAL REPORT].
107. Id. at 33-57.
108. Fair-Use Guidelines for Electronic Reserve Systems (Mar. 5, 1996), http://www.
utsystem.edu/ogcintellectualproperty/rsrvguid.htm.
109. NATL COMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
54-55 (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html.
110. Id. at 55.
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of materials in libraries in compliance with the fair use provisions
of the Copyright Act.'
In addition to guidelines for educators and librarians, private
entities have recently issued fair use guidelines for documentary
filmmakers'12 and creators of online videos." 3 The Documentary
Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use, issued in
2005, sets out what documentary filmmakers understand as "rea-
sonable application" of fair use law." 4 The Code of Best Practices in
Fair Use for Online Video, issued in 2008 by a group of professors
and lawyers, is designed to help creators of online video understand
what uses they can make of copyrighted works."5
Fair use guidelines have been met with varying success. Given
that guidelines lack the force of law, courts have not been uniform
in the significance assigned to them."6 In some cases, guidelines
have been used in ways contrary to their original purpose. For
example, the Classroom Guidelines have been treated as setting
out a fair use ceiling rather than a minimum. In a closely watched
case, New York University, in settling a lawsuit by the Association
of American Publishers, agreed to be bound by the Classroom
111. In 1982, the ALA released its Model Policy Concerning College and University
Photocopying for Classroom, Research and Library Reserve Use. Mary Hutchings, Model Policy
Concerning College and University Photocopying for Classroom, Research and Library Reserve
Use, COLL. & RES. LIBR. NEWS, Apr. 1982, at 127. In 1986, Mary Hutchings Reed and Debra
Stanek developed guidelines entitled Library and Classroom Use of Copyrighted Videotapes
and Computer Software. Mary Hutchings & Debra Stanek, Library and Classroom Use of
Copyrighted Videotapes and Computer Software, AM. LIBR., Feb. 1986, at 120A.
112. ASS'N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS, ETAL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT
OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
files/pdf/fair-use-final.pdf [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY FILMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES].
113. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE & INTELLECTUAL PROP., CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR
USE FOR ONLINE VIDEO (2008), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/
onlinebest-practices_in_ fair.use.pdf [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES FOR ONLINE VIDEO].
114. DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 112, at 1.
115. BEST PRACTICES FOR ONLINE VIDEO, supra note 113, at 1.
116. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91
(6th Cir. 1996) ("Although the guidelines do not purport to be a complete and definitive
statement of fair use law for educational copying, and although they do not have the force of
law, they do provide us general guidance. The fact that [defendant's] copying is light years
away from the safe harbor of the guidelines weighs against a finding of fair use."); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphic Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting
that "the Classroom Guidelines express a specific prohibition of anthologies," but "refus[ing]
to hold that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited without a fair use analysis").
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Guidelines as setting forth the maximum amount of permissible
copying."1 Guidelines also have been subject to criticism for failing
to properly reflect the law of fair use,11 for being unduly rigid,'
1 9
and for supplanting a more nuanced fair use analysis.
20
Guidelines can help inform the choices an agency will face in
adopting fair use regulations. The agency will need to select a point
on the continuum from standards to rules. Preexisting guidelines
have taken different approaches. The Multimedia Guidelines adopt
a rules approach. These guidelines meticulously set out "portion
limitations" defining the amount of specific kinds of copyrighted
works educators and students may use in their multimedia
projects. 2' For example, with respect to motion media, the guide-
lines state: 'Up to 10% or 3 minutes, whichever is less, in the
aggregate of a copyrighted motion media work may be reproduced
or otherwise incorporated as part of an educational multimedia
project created under Section 2 of these guidelines."'22 With respect
to numerical data sets, the guidelines provide:
Up to 10% or 2500 fields or cell entries, whichever is less, from
a copyrighted database or data table may be reproduced or
otherwise incorporated as part of a [sic] educational multimedia
project .... A field entry is defined as a specific item of informa-
tion, such as a name or Social Security number, in a record of a
database file. A cell entry is defined as the intersection where a
row and a column meet on a spreadsheet.'23
On the other hand, the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for
Online Video reflects a standards approach. For example, with
117. See Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-CIV-8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 1134,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
118. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 665 (2001) (writing that the Classroom Guidelines "depart
abruptly from the law itself').
119. See id. at 697 (writing that most fair use guidelines fail to reflect the inherent
flexibility of fair use law).
120. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1899, 1920 (2007) ("The extreme specificity of the Classroom Guidelines stands in
stark contrast to the open-ended nature of the [statutory] fair use criteria.").
121. CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 53.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 54.
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respect to commentary or criticism, the Code states: "Video makers
have the right to use as much of the original work as they need in
order to put it under some kind of scrutiny," but "[t]he use should
not be so extensive or pervasive that it ceases to function as critique
and becomes, instead, a way of satisfying the audience's taste for
the thing (or the kind of thing) that is being quoted."'24
The Classroom Guidelines combine rules and standards. Under
these guidelines, copying of books and periodicals for classroom use
is permitted when the copying meets designated tests of brevity,
spontaneity, and cumulative effect.' 25 The tests for brevity and
cumulative effect reflect a rules approach. Each is defined with
precision. For example, with respect to poetry, brevity is defined as
"(a) A complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed on not
more than two pages or, (b) from a longer poem, an excerpt of not
more than 250 words." '26 Other numerical limits apply to different
kinds of works. The test for cumulative effect contains three con-
ditions: the copying is "for only one course in the school"; "[n]ot more
than one short poem, article, story, essay or two excerpts may be
copied from the same author, nor more than three from the same
collective work or periodical volume during one class term"; and no
more than nine instances of copying may be made for a single
course.'27 Under the same guidelines, however, the definition of
spontaneity reflects a standards approach. The guidelines define
spontaneity as when:
(i) The copying is at the instance and inspiration of the individ-
ual teacher, and (ii) The inspiration and decision to use the work
and the moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness
are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a
timely reply to a request for permission.
121
As these examples suggest, the agency's regulations can be
written more like rules, more like standards, or as a combination of
rules and standards. This is not the place to resolve which choice
124. BEST PRACTICES FOR ONLINE VIDEO, supra note 113, at 5, 6.
125. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-82.
126. Id. at 68.
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id.
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the agency should make along the continuum. The agency cannot
make the appropriate choice until it receives input from experts,
interested parties, and members of the public. The right choice also
likely will depend on the types of works at issue. In some cases,
when precision is more important than flexibility, a strong rules-
based approach-like numerical limitations on copying-might be
appropriate. In other instances, the agency might conclude that it
is too difficult or undesirable to adopt numerical limits or other
rules and that an approach grounded in standards better reflects
and protects fair use. Dissatisfaction with the quantitative approach
of preexisting guidelines should not lead one to think that an
agency, empowered to make legally binding regulations, should
avoid precision. Likewise, the current shortcomings of the four stat-
utory standards should not mean all standards-based approaches
should be off the table. Past experiences should inform the future
process but not limit its options.'29 That said, the agency should
ensure that it does not produce regulations that are so complex that
only experts can decipher and apply them. Right now, fair use is too
vague to guide behavior. The agency needs to be careful that it does
not produce the opposite problem of requiring users to work through
a thicket of confusing rules before making use of a copyrighted
work. An open process, in which nonexperts have an opportunity to
play a role in the development of regulations, is essential for
guarding against this risk.
The agency (or Congress in empowering the agency) likewise will
need to consider how the agency's own regulations will relate to the
existing fair use case law. At a minimum, it would be wise for the
agency to take account of how courts have decided fair use issues.
Courts have experience in this area. Cases demonstrate the kinds
of disputes that may arise, and judges have written extensively on
the reasons for and the meaning of fair use law. Based on a close
reading of approximately 300 fair use cases, Pamela Samuelson
129. Professor Crews, while critical of guidelines that are inconsistent with the flexible
nature of fair use, offers several recommendations for developing guidelines in the future that
may be applicable to the agency's work. See Crews, supra note 118, at 696-700. He suggests
that guidelines should begin with the four statutory fair use factors. Id. at 696. The guidelines
should be flexible in their definition of fair use and in how the statutory factors may be met.
Id. at 697. Guidelines also should be developed through a process that is open to the public
and in which parties staking out positions are required to provide legal justifications for those
positions. Id. at 699-700.
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reports that the cases fall into common patterns or policy-relevant
clusters-such as educational uses, news reporting, and par-
ody-and that within such clusters there is coherence among the
cases. 3 ° Samuelson argues that identifying which cluster a case
falls into is a helpful tool for determining whether a proposed use
would be fair-beyond simply applying the statutory fair use
factors.' 3 ' Although Samuelson's target audience is judges (and com-
mentators), her recommendation to "look ... for common patterns in
the fair use case law upon which to build a more predictable body of
fair use law"'32 is also useful advice to the agency as it develops fair
use regulations. Nonetheless, it is undesirable for the agency to be
bound by the courts' applications of the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act in past cases. The agency needs to be free to develop
regulations for future uses that reflect the interests of relevant
parties and of the general public. Requiring the agency to adhere to
past judicial decisions in specific disputes would interfere with this
task.
D. Locating the Agency
Thus far, this Article has described the creation of a new federal
agency to administer fair use. However, this function also could be
assigned to an existing federal agency. One possible candidate is
the Copyright Office, which is part of the Library of Congress, a
legislative agency. "' Other commentators also have proposed an
increased role in intellectual property law by the Copyright Office.
For example, Mark Lemley and R. Anthony Reese have proposed
giving copyright owners the option to bring an infringement action
before an ALJ within the Copyright Office against consumers who
upload copyrighted works on peer-to-peer networks.' Joseph Liu
argues in favor of giving the Copyright Office increased rulemaking,
adjudicatory, and enforcement authority, particularly with respect
130. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 2541 & n.27.
131. Id. at 2542 & n.28.
132. Id. at 2621.
133. U.S. Copyright Office, A Brief Introduction and History, http://www.copyright.
gov/circs/circla.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
134. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1413 (2004).
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to complex issues raised by technological change." 5 As Professor Liu
notes, however, significant changes would need to be made to the
structure and makeup of the Copyright Office in order for it to have
the expertise and resources to fulfill these sorts of additional
responsibilities.136
The role of the Copyright Office in rulemaking under the anti-
circumvention provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) shows the possibility of relying upon that office to adminis-
ter fair use and also suggests some need for caution. 3 ' The DMCA
provides for the Librarian of Congress, based on rulemaking
recommendations from the Register of Copyrights, to adopt three-
year renewable exemptions to the access prohibition for particular
"class[es] of copyrighted works," when users of the works "are, or are
likely to be ... adversely affected" in their ability to make non-
infringing uses of the works."3 8 In issuing exemptions, the Librarian
of Congress is required to take account of the availability of the
copyrighted works for nonprofit, archival preservation, and
educational purposes; the impact of the prohibition on circumven-
tion on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
or research; the effect of circumvention on the market for or value
of copyrighted works; and other factors as the Librarian considers
appropriate.'39 The exemptions the Librarian of Congress has issued
under this provision have followed extensive notice and comment
and public hearings conducted by the Copyright Office. 4 ' These
135. Liu, supra note 64, at 148-56. In a suggestion that resonates with the themes of this
Article, Professor Liu writes, for example, that "rather than enacting specific industry
exemptions to copyright liability, Congress could delegate to the Copyright Office the
authority to promulgate additional exemptions via regulation," such that "exemption through
regulation could perhaps usefully fill a gap currently left by the relative lack of guidance from
fair use doctrine, and provide additional guidance and certainty to industries that routinely
encounter difficult fair use issues." Id. at 151-52.
136. Id. at 156-57. The United States Patent and Trademark Office also could be given
responsibility for administering fair use. CONFU acted under the auspices of the USPTO in
developing its guidelines (although the USPTO had no authority to make legally binding
guidelines). See CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 106. The USPTO, however, already is
understaffed and would require additional resources.
137. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006).
138. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
139. Id.
140. See U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/anticirc.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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exemptions take the form of rules-specific classes of works are
exempted from the anticircumvention provision-based on the
Librarian's application of the standards set forth in the DMCA.'41
Under the most recent DMCA rulemaking in 2006, the Copyright
Office recommended and the Librarian of Congress adopted six
exemptions, of which three were renewed from prior rulemakings.1
42
This DMCA rulemaking has not been without controversy.
Critics have complained that the Librarian-and by extension the
Copyright Office-has unduly favored content owners, particularly
by failing to provide an exemption for fair use or for consumers to
make backup copies of lawfully-purchased media. 143 There also has
been criticism that the Librarian (and the Copyright Office) has
taken a very narrow view of the exemption provision of the DMCA,
imposed unduly high standards for granting an exemption, and
granted far fewer exemptions than were warranted.
14 4
Thus, although the Copyright Office has some rulemaking ex-
perience, this experience suggests that Congress would need to
consider carefully whether and how the Copyright Office can be
relied upon to implement fair use regulations--or whether the task
should be assigned to a new agency. More generally, whether a new
agency is created or an existing agency assigned responsibility,
there is a risk that the agency will be captured by special interest
141. Id.
142. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 201).
143. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, DMCATRIENNALRULEMAKING: FAILING
THE DIGITAL CONSUMER 2 (2005), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/DMCA.
rulemaking-broken.pdf ("[The DMCA triennial rulemaking has failed to protect lawful
consumer activities.").
144. See The Digital Media Consumers'Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 100, 102, 107 (2004) (statement of Chris Murray, Legislative Counsel,
Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America) (complaining that despite hundreds of
legitimate requests and thousands of pages of written submissions and oral testimony, the
"rulemaking proceeding has largely failed to protect non-infringing uses" because of the
Copyright Office's "constricted interpretation of the standard one must meet to acquire an
exemption"); Christine Haight Farley et al., Clinical Legal Education and the Public Interest
in Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 735, 741 (2008) ("By the time the 2006
rulemaking round arrived, many disenchanted public interest advocates had written off the
rulemaking process as futile, and many of those who had earlier requested exemptions took
a pass.").
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groups. Given the high stakes involved in fair use determinations
and the far-reaching effects of an agency's fair use regulations,
particular care should be taken to ensure the agency's decision
making is balanced. Agency funding is an important element of
agency independence. Jessica Litman contends that, rather than
serving the interests of Congress (and by extension the general
public), "the Copyright Office has tended to view copyright owners
as its real constituency" '145 because the copyright bar protects the
Copyright Office from congressional budget cuts. One way to avoid
this problem is to give the agency responsible for fair use an
independent income source. For example, TOFU could retain civil
penalties it collects from parties who unlawfully interfere with fair
use. CIRO could collect fees from the copyright owners who appear
before it before bringing a copyright infringement suit.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF AGENCY ADMINISTRATION
Administering fair use has significant benefits. Fair use regula-
tions issued by an agency are preferable to other efforts to bring
predictability to fair use determinations. In particular, many
commentators have offered proposals to adjust the rules of litigation
in order to protect fair uses from the risk of litigation or from
adverse rulings. Some commentators recommend increasing the
accuracy of fair use rulings by shifting the burden of proof of fair
use elements when the copyright owner is more likely to have access
to the relevant evidence.'46 Other proposals eliminate or reduce
145. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 74 (2001).
146. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1178-79 (2000); Thomas F.
Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1308-11 (2008); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches'Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
233, 321-23 (1988); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 1028 (2007) (proposing that fair use should focus on whether
there is harm to the original use's market, and as a part of that suggestion proposing that
courts should shift the burden of proof for the market harm factor); Kenneth D. Crews, Fair
Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1, 68-70, 77-80 (1999) (suggesting that, with regard to fair use of unpublished works, once a
defendant shows a lack of awareness regarding the owner's intent to publish the work or to
prevent publication of the work, a presumption should be established that the copyright
owner has the burden of rebutting); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony
Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 1014 (2002); cf. Gordon, supra note 21, at1624-26 (arguing that
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damages against defendants who have a good faith but mistaken
belief that their use was a fair use.'47 A different proposal makes
attorney's fees available to a prevailing party to deter copyright
owners from bringing weak copyright infringement claims while
encouraging defendants to assert fair use defenses.'48 Each of these
proposals seeks to reduce the risks that a fair use of a copyrighted
work will be the subject of a copyright infringement action. Yet
these proposals are based on a model of fair use as litigation rather
than as administration. Under the litigation model, only a judicial
ruling determines whether any particular use is ultimately fair (or
not). Fair use regulations, issued by an agency, instead would
provide predictability at the outset. Individuals would be able to
consult the regulations and determine in advance whether a
proposed use of a copyrighted work is fair. The risk of litigation
would vastly diminish.
Fair use regulations also would provide certainty to a large
number of users at once. An agency, therefore, offers an advantage
over the nonjudicial entities other commentators have proposed to
make fair use determinations. Michael Carroll has suggested that
Congress amend the Copyright Act to create a "Fair Use Board"
within the Copyright Office with power to declare a proposed use
of a copyrighted work to be a fair use.'49 Similar to a private letter
ruling from the IRS or a no action letter from the SEC, a favorable
opinion from the Fair Use Board would immunize the petitioner
from copyright liability for the proposed use. Under Carroll's ap-
proach, the copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity
to challenge the petition. 50 Because a favorable ruling by the Fair
Use Board would only apply to the party bringing the petition, the
courts should shift the burden of proof of market failure only on a case-by-case basis).
147. See MAJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURvIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION
IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 57 (2005), available at http://www.brennancenter
.org/page/-Id/downloadfile_9056.pdf (offering a proposal to "eliminate money damages
against anybody who reasonably guesses wrong about a fair use or free expression defense,"
leaving only injunctive relief as a remedy); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L.
REv. 1087, 1145-46 (2007) (suggesting that "statutory damages should be unavailable against
those who use a copyrighted work in good faith but with a mistaken belief that such a use was
a fair use").
148. Cotter, supra note 146, at 1304-08 (arguing in favor of the English rule of an
automatic award of attorney fees to the prevailing party).
149. See Carroll, supra note 147.
150. Id. at 1090-91.
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copyright owner would remain free to challenge the same or similar
uses by other parties.'51 David Nimmer would have Congress
authorize a fair use arbitration system.'52 Under Nimmer's ap-
proach, the Register of Copyrights would identify a list of qualified
arbiters. 5 3 A user of copyrighted material who is unable to negotiate
a license agreement with the copyright owner would be permitted
to institute a Fair Use Arbitration.'54 The copyright owner would
have an opportunity to respond. 5 5 Both parties would be permitted
to object to a certain percentage of the available arbiters.'56 The case
would be heard before one arbiter that neither party had objected to,
or, if the case is identified by the parties as a complex matter, before
three arbiters that neither party had objected to. 5 ' The arbiter or
arbiters would issue a ruling on whether the use is fair, along with
reasons for the decision."'
Although there is much to commend in allowing parties to obtain
a determination prior to infringement litigation as to whether a use
is fair,'59 both proposals fall short in that they provide certainty only
to the individual user who goes through Carroll's Fair Use Board or
Nimmer's arbitration, and the certainty is only with respect to the
particular use that is reviewed. Other users will not know whether
their uses are fair use unless they, too, go through the process.
Certainty on a large scale is therefore impossible. Millions of uses
of copyrighted works occur annually. Even if a small portion of these
uses were the subject of a request for individual review, it quickly
would overwhelm the capacities of the board or the arbiters.
151. Id.
152. See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2006).
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 13.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 14.
158. Id.
159. Neither Carroll's nor Nimmer's model entirely escapes the litigation model of fair use.
Under Nimmer's approach, the Fair Use Board's rulings would be subject to administrative
review in the Copyright Office and to de novo review by the federal courts of appeals. Carroll,
supra note 147, at 1123. While the user would know in advance whether the proposed use is
fair (rather than after making the use and being sued for it), judicial review is likely to slow
down and make expensive fair use determinations. Under Nimmer's approach, the arbiter's
ruling would not be binding on a court in an infringement action but would be relevant to the
court's determination of damages and attorney's fees. Nimmer, supra note 152, at 14-15.
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Regulations issued by an administrative agency, by contrast, work
wholesale. They apply to all users, giving them virtual certainty as
to whether their uses are fair, without the need for individualized
adjudication.
An administrative agency is in a better position than is a court to
generate fair use rules that are tailored to individual contexts but
that still reflect a uniform body of law."6 An agency can both tailor
rules to particular sectors and harmonize rules across sectors.
Among other things, an agency will be able to take account of
practices and interests in specific industries, assess the economic
impact on copyright owners of allowing particular uses as fair, and
hear from creators about their needs and interests. An agency can
track the success and failings of regulations in one sector in order
to inform decisions about regulating in another. Similarly, an
agency is in a better position than is a court to examine broadly the
purposes of fair use. Courts necessarily operate with limited infor-
mation and on the basis of a record developed by the parties.
Commentators have offered thoughtful proposals for how to imple-
ment each of the four fair use factors, 6' including in ways that
160. Executive Order 12866 imposes a number of requirements on rulemakingby executive
agencies. It provides that agencies should promulgate "only such regulations as are required
by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need,
such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the
public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people." Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 C.F.R. 190 (1993). Further, in deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies must "assess
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not
regulating," and in selecting among regulatory approaches, agencies should seek to "maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory
approach." Id.
161. See, e.g., Africa, supra note 146, at 1175-80 (proposing various modifications to how
courts have implemented the fourth fair use factor concerning market effects); William W.
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1739-44 (1988)
(arguing in favor of broadening the conception of harm to copyright owners to include: the loss
in the owner's general welfare as a result of the use if the use is permitted; sensitivity to
harms that occur when a use undermines the owner's price discrimination scheme,
considering the creative character of the use and providing greater protection to more creative
uses; and setting forth a systematic way of categorizing copyrighted works and uses and
establishing fair use rules for each respective category); Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is
Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448-50 (2008)
(proposing that, when asking whether a use is transformative in applying the first fair-use
factor, the analysis focus on the degree of transformation from the perspective of the reader
of the new work); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1110-36 (1990) (providing an analysis of the relevant considerations in applying each of the
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protect First Amendment interests,162 recognize social and cultural
practices,163 and take account of other public interests."64 An agency
would be in a stronger position to take account of these kinds of
concerns in developing regulations than can a court when it decides
a specific case based on a limited record.
In addition, an agency would provide a setting for articulating the
qualities of works that should be protected by fair use and identify-
ing the kinds of works that present those qualities. Although few
would admit it (and fewer judges still), determinations of whether
a use is fair reflects some degree of judgment about the value of the
work. Value can mean different things in the fair use context: from
how closely the use of the work reflects the purposes of fair use to
whether the use of the work is of sufficient importance to deserve
protection. Those values are often left unarticulated. Agency rule-
making provides an opportunity for value judgments to be made
openly and brought under scrutiny.
At the same time, an agency would be in a better position than
Congress to adapt to change. Some commentators have recom-
mended that Congress amend the fair use provision of the Copyright
Act to more specifically set out uses that are fair. In particular,
these commentators urge that Congress should adopt statutory safe
harbors that would specify an amount of copying that is per se fair
use-leaving uses beyond that amount subject to enforcement in the
courts.165 Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman, for example,
fair use factors).
162. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004) (advocating "tinker[ing] with the
elements in the standard fair use test, in particular the purpose of the use and the amount
used," in order to accommodate free speech concerns).
163. See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1525, 1623, 1642-44 (2004) (advocating that the fair use factors be applied with a view
to whether the use is fair "in the context of a recognized social or cultural pattern"); Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1291, 1296, 1301, 1306-10 (1999) (suggesting that
societal acceptance of what is a fair use should inform fair use analysis); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138-40, 1150-53,
1160-61 (1990) (same).
164. See Lunney, supra note 146, at 999-1029 (advocating an approach that balances "the
extent to which prohibiting a particular use will lead to more and better works of authorship"
with "what the public stands to lose if the use is prohibited").
165. See Cotter, supra note 146, at 1312-14 (advocating the incorporation into fair use law
of a rule setting minimum amounts of permissible copying while retaining the current flexible
standard for uses that involve copying above and beyond the minimum permitted amount);
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argue that Congress should specify that for literary works that are
at least one hundred words long, either a total of fifteen percent or
three hundred words of a work, whichever is shorter, may be copied
without permission. 166With respect to sound recordings and musical
compositions, either a total of ten percent or ten seconds, whichever
is shorter, should be deemed fair use.'67 For audiovisual works,
these authors argue that a total of either ten percent or thirty
seconds, whichever is shorter, may be reproduced and that "anyone
may include in an audiovisual work any architectural, choreo-
graphic, or pictorial work, so long as that work is not displayed for
more than thirty seconds and provided those thirty seconds
comprise no more than ten percent of the new work."'6 8 Clarity in
fair use is surely desirable. However, Congress is not the best entity
for producing it. Congress's slow and deliberate processes are not
well-suited to generating fair use rules that keep pace with
changing circumstances. An agency, which has the flexibility to
adopt rules quickly, is in a better position to specify the details of
uses that are fair, to revise and update its rules when necessary,
and to issue new rules as industries or technologies evolve, new
practices emerge, different uses become prevalent, or new concerns
take hold.'
Agency regulation is also preferable to relying on contracts and
the market to determine which uses of copyrighted works are
permissible. The current vagueness of the fair use law allows
copyright owners to use contracts in ways that undermine fair use.
By providing precision, agency regulation will promote uses of
copyrighted works that do not require advance approval by and
payment to a copyright owner. Many contracts are highly restric-
tive. Agency regulation will allow uses beyond those a copyright
owner would permit. Contracts also allow copyright owners to
prevent criticism and stifle other forms of speech they do not favor.
Agency regulation will better serve the First Amendment interests
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1511-18
(2007).
166. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 165, at 1511-12.
167. Id. at 1512-14.
168. Id. at 1514-18.
169. The APA allows members of the public to petition an agency for rulemaking. See 5
U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.").
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that fair use protects. Further, reliance upon contracts means that
permissible uses may vary. Different copyright owners have dif-
ferent rules about how their works may be used; contract law is
state law and so the enforceability and interpretation of contrac-
tual provisions vary among states. Agency regulation will restore
uniformity to fair use.
Each of the two agency models offered here confers particular
additional benefits. 7 ° Model One provides for affirmative pro-
tections for fair uses of copyrighted works. Recognizing that agency-
issued rules are only effective if people abide by them, Model One
addresses two sources of noncompliance. First, copyright owners
might continue to assert a more restrictive version of fair use than
the law-now in the form of agency regulation-in fact provides and
threaten copyright infringement actions against users who comply
with the applicable fair use rules. Although it is likely that clarity
in fair use will reduce the likelihood of this problem, there nonethe-
less remains a risk that copyright owners will interfere with fair use
of copyrighted works. Under Model One, TOFU therefore is em-
powered to respond to efforts by copyright owners to interfere with
fair uses of copyrighted works. In much the same way as the FTC
brings enforcement actions in cases of unfair or deceptive trade
practices, TOFU would be able to charge a copyright owner with
interfering with fair uses of the copyrighted works, and, in appropri-
ate cases, to assess civil penalties and issue cease and desist orders.
Second, fair use regulations will lose their enforcement power if
copyright owners continue to condition access to a copyright work on
an agreement to forego fair uses of the work. Having clear fair use
rules is meaningless if fair use has been waived. Under Model One,
federal law, therefore, preempts state contract law that permits
copyright owners and consumers of copyrighted works to contract
out of fair use. Agreements in which a consumer gives up a fair use
claim, or accepts a definition of fair use that is more restrictive than
provided for by federal law, become unenforceable.
Model Two reflects the recognition that even when regulations
clarify uses that are fair, some disputes over fair use will nonethe-
less occur. Therefore, in addition to issuing regulations, the agency
is empowered to determine fair uses in the first instance in specific
170. See supra Parts III.A-B.
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cases. In any subsequent lawsuit, the court would defer to those
determinations. While this procedure does not prevent copyright
owners from bringing infringement lawsuits in federal court even
when the use is fair according to the agency's judgment, the
procedure likely will deter virtually all claims in which the defen-
dant has made use of a work in accordance with the agency's fair
use regulations. Under Model Two, a regulation on point combined
with agency power to issue a decision in a specific case will shield
most fair uses from litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sketched an approach to fair use based in
administrative law, and it has offered two specific proposals for how
an agency could administer fair use. Although there-are additional
details that would need to be worked out, the goal here has been to
move in a new direction within a long-standing conversation about
reforming fair use law. I share the concern expressed by many other
commentators that fair use law presently does not work well. So far,
however, most efforts to reform fair use have assumed that it should
remain the province of Congress and the courts. In my judgment,
neither entity is likely to provide a law of fair use that meets the
current-and future needs of those who seek to make use of
copyrighted works while protecting also the interests of copyright
owners. Administration may prove to be fair use law's best partner.
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